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COMMENTS
THE EXERCISE OF FIRST AMENDMENT RIGHTS IN PRIVATELY
OWNED SHOPPING CENTERS
Lloyd Corporation v. Tanner
407 U.S. 551 (1972)
Respondents distributed anti-war handbills in the interior mall of
Lloyd Center, a large privately owned shopping center housing sixty
commercial tenants and occupying fifty acres of land surrounded by
four public streets. Uniformed guards employed by the center's own-
ers and commissioned with full police authority by the city of Portland
threatened respondents with arrest under state trespass laws pursuant
to Lloyd's policy against all handbilling. To avoid arrest, respondents
left the premises and subsequently sought injunctive and declaratory
relief' to prevent interference with their handbilling, asserting that it
was protected by the first and fourteenth amendments. A federal dis-
trict court granted the injunction, holding that Lloyd's flat prohibition
violated respondents' first amendment rights.2 The Ninth Circuit
Court of Appeals affirmed.3 The Supreme Court reversed and held:
A shopping center may non-discriminatorily prohibit the exercise of
first amendment rights on privately owned property that is open to the
public if the speech has no relation to the function of the property and
if there are alternative methods available for reaching the desired audi-
ence.
In carving out a special position for first amendment freedoms, the
Supreme Court has often emphasized the importance of a well-in-
I. Relief was sought under 28 U.S.C. § 2201 and 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1970).
28 US.C. § 2201 provides for declaratory judgments. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 provides:
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, custom, or usage, of
any State or Territory, subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the
United States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation
of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws,
shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other
proper proceeding for redress.
2. Tanner v. Lloyd Corp., 308 F. Supp. 128 (D. Ore. 1970).
3. Tanner v. Lloyd Corp., 446 F.2d 545 (9th Cir. 1971) (per curiam).
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formed public in a democratic society.4 The Court has consistently
recognized the right of access to public streets and parks for the pur-
pose of exercising first amendment rights,5 subject to reasonable regu-
lations as to time, place, and manner of such activity.6
The Supreme Court first dealt with the issue of the exercise of free
speech on private property in Marsh v. Alabama,7 which held that the
owner of a company town could not, through the use of state trespass
laws, prevent a Jehovah's Witness from distributing religious literature
in the business district of the town. Writing for the majority, Justice
Black emphasized that, although the property was privately owned, no
4. Watts v. United States, 394 U.S. 705 (1969); New York Times v. Sullivan,
376 U.S. 254 (1964). With reference to the preferred position doctrine, see, e.g.,
Kovacs v. Cooper, 336 U.S. 77 (1949); Jones v. Opelika, 316 U.S. 584, 608 (1942)
(dissenting opinion); Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U.S. 88 (1940); United States v. Caro-
lene Products Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938); Grosjean v. American Press Co.,
297 U.S. 233 (1936).
5. Hague v. CIO, 307 U.S. 496, 515 (1939):
Wherever the title of streets and parks may rest, they have immemorially
been held in trust for the use of the public and, time out of mind, have been
used for the purposes of assembly, communicating thoughts between citizens,
and discussing public questions.
The Court has approved the use of the streets for various modes of speech: Gregory
v. Chicago, 394 U.S. 111 (1969) (parading); Saia v. New York, 334 U.S. 558 (1948)
(sound trucks); Martin v. City of Struthers, 319 U.S. 141 (1943) (door-to-door can-
vassing for religious purposes); Jamison v. Texas, 318 U.S. 413 (1943) (handbill
distribution).
6. There are several permissible reasonable regulations: Adderly v. Florida,
385 U.S. 39 (1966) (exclusion where public property not generally open to the public);
Cox v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 536 (1965) (prevention of obstruction of traffic and
building entrance); Feiner v. New York, 340 U.S. 315 (1951) (use of fighting words);
Terminiello v. Chicago, 337 U.S. 1 (1949) (fighting words); Kovacs v. Cooper, 336
U.S. 77 (1949) (control of loud and annoying noises); Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire,
315 U.S. 568 (1942) (fighting words); Cox v. New Hampshire, 312 U.S. 569 (1941)
(prevention of obstruction).
Regulations of free speech to prevent littering and annoyance have been held in-
valid. See, e.g., Martin v. City of Struthers, 319 U.S. 141 (1943); Schneider v. State,
308 U.S. 147 (1939). Likewise invalid are fee requirements and systems of discretionary
licensing. See, e.g., Cox v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 536 (1965); Kunz v. New York, 340
U.S. 290 (1951); Murdock v. Pennsylvania, 319 U.S. 105 (1943); Cox v. New Hamp-
shire, 312 U.S. 569 (1941); Lovell v. City of Griffin, 303 U.S. 444 (1938).
For a good overview of the early cases concerning the accommodation of first
amendment rights to the use of the streets with public order and convenience, see
Niemotko v. Maryland, 340 U.S. 268, 273 (1951) (Frankfurter, J., concurring). See
also Kalven, The Concept of the Public Forum: Cox v. Louisiana, 1965 Sup. CT. RaV.
1.
7. 326 U.S. 501 (1946).
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other characteristic distinguished it from any other Alabama town,"
and that any ordinary municipality clearly could not have prevented
Marsh from exercising her first amendment rights.9 Because the pri-
vate property served a public function and its owner stood in the shoes
of the state, the private action came within the ambit of the first and
fourteenth amendments. 10
In Amalgamated Food Employees Local 590 v. Logan Valley Plaza,
Inc.," the Court took Marsh one step further and upheld the right of a
labor union to carry on peaceful informational picketing on the prem-
ises of a supermarket located in a privately owned shopping center.
Interpreting Marsh to stand for the proposition that "under some cir-
cumstances property that is privately owned may, at least for First
Amendment purposes, be treated as though it were publicly held,"' 2
the opinion relied on the theory that the center was the "functional
equivalent" of the business district in Marsh.'3 The Court also found
it important that there was no reasonable alternative location available
on public property. 14  Although the opinion seemed to rest on the
broad policy of the public's right of access to information, 1 the hold-
8. Id. at 502-03.
9. Jamison v. Texas, 318 U.S. 413 (1943); Lovell v. City of Griffin, 303 U.S.
444 (1938).
10, Marsh v. Alabama, 326 U.S. 501, 506 (1946):
Ownership does not always mean absolute dominion. The more an owner,
for his advantage, opens up his property for use by the public in general, the
more his rights become circumscribed by the statutory and constitutional
rights of those who use it.
See note 35 infra and accompanying text.
11. 391 U.S. 308 (1968).
12. Id. at 316.
13. 326 U.S. at 502-03.
14. The Court noted both the practical difficulty of reaching the relevant audience
as well as physical dangers which would result from relegating the pickets or hand-
billers to adjacent highways. Amalgamated Food Employees Local 590 v. Logan
Valley Plaza, Inc., 391 U.S. 308, 322 (1968). The Court also mentioned, but did not
comment on the merits of, the union's contention that unless the picketing was car-
ried out near the establishment that was the target of the informational picketing, it
might be held to constitute a secondary boycott. Id. at 323 n.12.
15. The Court also noted the rapid growth in the number and comprehensiveness of
modem suburban shopping centers. To have decided otherwise here would subject
downtown businesses to on-the-spot criticism, but "businesses situated in the suburbs
could largely immunize themselves by creating a cordon sanitaire of parking lots
around their stores. Neither precedent nor policy compels a result so at variance with
the goal of free expression and communication that is the heart of the First Amend-
ment." Id. at 325.
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ing was limited to preventing owners of private property that is the
"functional equivalent" of a business district from absolutely prohibit-
ing speech which is related to the function of the property.10 Justice
Black vigorously dissented,' 7 saying that Marsh turned on the fact that
an entire town was involved, not merely a business block."8
16. Amalgamated Food Employees Local 590 v. Logan Valley Plaza, Inc., 391 U.S.
308, 319-20 (1968):
All we decide here is that because the shopping center serves as the community
business block "and is freely accessible and open to the public in the area and
those passing through," [citing Marsh v. Alabama, 326 U.S. 501, 508 (1946)]
the State may not delegate the power, through the use of its trespass laws,
wholly to exclude those members of the public wishing to exercise their
First Amendment rights on the premises in a manner and for a purpose gen-
erally consonant with the use to which the property is actually put.
The Court explicitly refrained from discussing or deciding a case in which the picketing
was not directly related to the use of the property. Id. at 320 n.9. Consumers pro-
testing overpricing or shoddy merchandise and workers challenging substandard work-
ing conditions were mentioned by the Court as examples of speech that would be re-
lated to the function of the property. Id. at 324.
Both the opinion and the holding in Logan Valley were broad in that they applied
not only to picketing but also to handbilling. The Pennsylvania state court injunction
at issue in the case purported to prohibit all types of speech on Logan Valley's
property, and the Court refused to distinguish between picketing and handbilling for
the purpose of the right of access, because they are both "speech plus" situations, and
concluded that "a holding that petitioners are entitled to picket within the mall obvi-
ously extends to handbilling as well." Id. at 322 n.11.
17. Justice Black was the author of the Marsh opinion.
18. Justice Black also noted that Marsh had been arrested by a county deputy
sheriff who was paid by the town's owner, while no similar showing was made in
Logan Valley. 391 U.S. at 331 n.5.
Justice Harlan dissented on the ground that under the preemption doctrine the case
should have been decided on statutory grounds, National Labor Relations Act, 29
U.S.C. § 151 et seq. (1970), rather than constitutional grounds. Id. at 333. Justice
White's dissent noted the logical difficulty of limiting the rationale of the case to
only related speech. Id. at 339.
Although the lower federal courts and the state courts are split on the extent to
which privately owned property may be treated as though publicly held for first
amendment purposes, they usually have upheld a right of access to shopping centers,
especially since the Logan Valley case.
The Second Circuit devised a flexible test which looked to the nature and use of
the property rather than the ownership in striking down a blanket prohibition of hand-
billing in a bus depot. That test considered whether "the character of the place, the
pattern of usual activity, the nature of its essential purpose and the population who
take advantage of the general invitation extended make it an appropriate place for
communication of views on issues of political and social significance." Wolin v. Port
of New York Authority, 392 F.2d 83, 89 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 940 (1958).
Courts have used similar reasoning to reach comparable results with respect to railway
stations. See, e.g., In re Hoffman, 67 Cal. 2d 845, 434 P.2d 353, 64 Cal. Rptr. 97
(1967) (railway station); People v. St. Clair, 56 Misc. 2d 326, 288 N.Y.S.2d 388
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(City Crim. Ct. 1968) (subway platform). The New York World's Fair Corporation
was allowed to exclude N.A.A.C.P. pickets from the fairgrounds on the basis that
picketing would unduly interfere with the Fair, but the court indicated that handbilling
would have to be allowed on first amendment grounds. Farmer v. Moses, 232 F.
Supp. 154. 161 (S.D.N.Y. 1964).
The weight of authority has placed some types of buildings beyond the reach of the
first and fourteenth amendments: Chicago v. Rosser, 47 Ill. 2d 10, 264 N.E.2d 158
(1970) (office buildings); Watchtower Bible and Tract Soc. v. Metropolitan Life Ins.
Co., 297 N.Y. 339, 79 N.E.2d 433 (1948), cert. denied, 335 U.S. 866 (1949) (apart-
nient buildings); Hall v. Commonwealth, 188 Va. 72, 49 S.E.2d 369 (1948) (apart-
ment building); cf. Commonwealth v. Richardson, 313 Mass. 632, 48 N.E.2d 678
(1943),
Decisions involving colleges and universities have generally turned on the degree
of state or federal financial involvement. See Powe v. Miles, 407 F.2d 73 (2d Cir.
1968); Grossner v. Trustees of Columbia University, 287 F. Supp. 535 (S.D.N.Y.
1968): cf. O'Leary v. Commonwealth, 441 S.W.2d 150 (Ky. 1969). On the issue of
state action, see note 34 infra.
Many cases involving the exercise of free speech on private property used for com-
mercial purposes, both shopping centers and free-standing stores, have arisen in the
context of labor activity, and have been dealt with on statutory grounds. The principal
case in this area is NLRB v. Babcock & Wilcox Co., 351 U.S. 105 (1956), which in-
volved union picketing in an employee parking lot of a manufacturing plant. Basing
its opinion on statutory rights of self-organization granted by the National Labor Rela-
tions Act §§ 7 and 8(a)(1), the Court held that an invasion of the employer's property
would be warranted only where no adequate alternative was available, such as reaching
the employees at home. In Central Hardware v. NLRB, 407 U.S. 539 (1972), on
rendam, 468 F.2d 253 (8th Cir. 1972), the court reaffirmed Babcock & Wilcox and
extended it to a situation where the parking lot was open to the public. The entire
Court agreed to dispose of the case on statutory grounds. For cases in this area dis-
posed by the courts on statutory grounds, see, e.g., Taggart v. Weinacker's, Inc., 397
U.S. 223 (1970); Amalgamated Meat Cutters Local 427 v. Fairlawn Meats, 353 U.S.
20 (1957); Marshall Field & Co. v. NLRB, 200 F.2d 375 (7th Cir. 1952); South Dis-
count Foods v. Retail Clerks Local 1552, 14 Ohio Misc. 188, 235 N.E.2d 143 (1968);
Freeman v. Retail Clerks Local 1207, 58 Wash. 2d 426, 363 P.2d 803 (1961).
Among the courts that have reached the constitutional issue in a labor situation
there is substantial agreement that property rights must yield to first amendment rights.
See, e.g., Schwartz-Torrance Inv. Corp. v. Bakery & Confectionery Workers Local 31,
61 Cal. 2d 766, 394 P.2d 921, 40 Cal. Rptr. 233, cert. denied, 380 U.S. 906 (1964);
State v. Williams, 44 L.R.R.M. 2357 (Bait., Md., Crim. Ct. 1959); Amalgamated
Clothing Workers v. Wonderland Shopping Center, 370 Mich. 547, 122 N.W.2d 785
(1963) (equally divided court); Moreland Corp. v. Retail Store Employees Local 444,
16 Wis. 2d 499, 114 N.W.2d 876 (1962). California has extended the same rationale
to free-standing stores. In re Lane, 71 Cal. 2d 872, 457 P.2d 561, 79 Cal. Rptr. 729
(1969). Contra, Hood v. Stafford, 213 Tenn. 684, 378 S.W.2d 766 (1964).
The labor cases would clearly seem to fall within the specific limitation in Logan
Vallev that the speech be related to the function of the property. See note 16 supra.
Some state courts have indicated a willingness to ignore this limitation when faced with
cases of non-related speech. See, e.g., Diamond v. Bland, 3 Cal. 3d 653, 477 P.2d 733,
91 Cal. Rptr. 501 (1970), cert. denied, 402 U.S. 988 (1971) (circulation of initiative
petitions in shopping center permitted); State v. Miller, 280 Minn. 566, 159 N.W.2d
Washington University Open Scholarship
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The Court in Lloyd Corporation v. Tanner"9 refused to extend
Marsh and limited Logan Valley to its precise facts. Citing Justice
Black's dissent in Logan Valley,20 the majority opinion interpreted
Marsh to apply only when an entire town was involved, reading the
language in Logan Valley concerning the "functional equivalent" of a
business district as dictum. 21  The Court held that the two require-
ments imposed by Logan Valley,22 the existence of a direct relation be-
tween the function of the property and the speech and the absence of
alternative locations, 23 had not been met in the instant case. The ma-
jority found it inconclusive that the shopping center was open to the
public, since the invitation was limited to the purpose of doing business
with the tenants. 24  That the management of Lloyd Center did allow
some meetings and fund-raising activities to take place on the premises
was considered consistent with the majority's reasoning by charac-
terizing those activities as promotional. 25  The property thus retained
its private character and, as such, its protection under the fifth and
fourteenth amendments. Even though first amendment freedoms oc-
cupy a preferred position,20 the Court found no difficulty in favoring
the accommodation of property rights when there had been no dedi-
895 (1968) (pamphlet distribution for political candidate); Sutherland v. Southcenter
Shopping Center, 3 Wash. App. 833, 478 P.2d 792 (1971) (allowed to use shopping
center mall to collect signature on environmental petition, subject to reasonable regula-
tion of conduct). See also In re Cox, 3 Cal. 3d 205, 474 P.2d 992, 90 Cal. Rptr. 24
(1970) (dictum). Courts in these and other cases have noted the logical difficulty in
confining Logan Valley to its avowed limitation. See Amalgamated Food Employees
Local 590 v. Logan Valley Plaza, Inc., 391 U.S. 308, 339 (1968) (dissenting opinion);
T. EMERSON, THE SYSTEM OF FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION 309 (1970); Comment, Picketing
of the Modern Marketplace: The Rights of Ownership and Free Speech, 48 B.U.L.
REv. 699 (1968); Comment, The Shopping Center: Quasi-Public Forun for Suburbia,
6 U. SAN FRANcisco L. REV. 103 (1971); 53 MINN. L. REV. 873 (1969).
19. 407 U.S. 551 (1972).
20. Amalgamated Food Employees Local 590 v. Logan Valley Plaza, Inc., 391
U.S. 308, 332 (1968).
21. Lloyd Corp. v. Tanner, 407 U.S. 551, 562 (1972).
22. See note 16 supra and accompanying text.
23. Lloyd Corp. v. Tanner, 407 U.S. 551, 563 (1972).
24. Id. at 564.
25. Id. at 565.
26. Lloyd Corp. v. Tanner, 407 U.S. 551, 567-68, 570 (1972):
mhe First and Fourteenth Amendments safeguard the rights of free speech
and assembly by limitations on state action, not on action by the owner of
private property used nondiscriminatorily for private purposes only....
[T]his Court has never held that a trespasser or uninvited guest may exercise
general rights of free speech on property privately owned and used nondis-
criminatorily for private purposes only.
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cation of private property to public use, since the fourteenth amend-
ment limits only state action and not non-discriminatory private ac-
tion.2 7
Justice Marshall's dissent,25 however, found no constitutionally sig-
nificant distinction between Logan Valley and the instant case.2 9 He
claimed Logan Valley had extended Marsh beyond the context of the
company town into situations when property serves as the functional
equivalent of the business block.' While acknowledging Logan Valley's
limitation to speech to be "generally consonant with the use to which the
property is actually put,"'" the dissenters noted that the property was
being used for first amendment purposes, but only at the management's
discretion.'- The dissent also indicated that, as a practical matter,
there was no adequate alternative available to reach the relevant audi-
ence.
: :;
Lloyd Corporation v. Tanner raises more questions than it answers.
27. Id. at 569.
28. Justice Marshall, the author of the Logan Valley opinion, was joined in his dis-
sent by Justices Brennan, Douglas, and Stewart.
29. The differences he did find indicated that Lloyd Center was even more simi-
lar to the company town in Marsh than was Logan Valley Plaza. Lloyd Center was
much larger and housed a greater variety of facilities, there was more interconnection
with public streets, and the privately paid policemen were given full police authority by
the city. Id. at 575.
30. 1i. at 574-75.
31 Amalgamated Food Employees Local 590 v. Logan Valley Plaza, Inc., 391
US. 308, 320 (1968).
32. Lloyd Corp. v. Tanner, 407 U.S. 551, 578 (1972). Lloyd Center's facilities
has in the past been open to presidential candidates of both parties, displays of Na-
tional Guard weaponry, football rallies, concerts, solicitation by the Salvation Army
and American Legion, but denied to the March of Dimes and Hadassah. Brief for
Respondent at 37-39.
33. Attempting to distribute the handbills to moving autos leaving the center
would involve considerable physical danger. The dissent also noted that shopping
centers are where the relevant audience is to be found in the suburbs, and the means
of reaching this audience is severely circumscribed, especially for poorly financed
causes, when the shopping center is eliminated as a potential forum. Lloyd Corp. v.
Tanner, 407 U.S. 551, 586 (1972).
Justice Marshall's inability to reconcile the result in Lloyd with that in Logan
i'allev called forth a harsh remark on the composition of the Court:
[lilt is Logan Valley itself that the Court finds bothersome. The vote in Lo-
gan Valley was 6-3, and that decision is only four years old. But I am aware
that the composition of this Court has radically changed in four years. . ..
There is no distinction between that case and this one, and therefore, the re-
sults in both cases should be the same.
Id. at 584.
433
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One of the most important is its effect on the doctrine of state action.3 4
The Court ignores the public function of the shopping center, pivotal
in Logan Valley, and speaks of an apparently stricter test, "dedication
to public use," 35 but fails to give any guidelines for its application. 0
Also disconcerting is the short shrift the majority accords Logan Val-
ley. Citing almost exclusively from the dissents in that case,87 the
Court relies far more heavily on Marsh and ignores the significant ex-
tension of Marsh in Logan Valley. The most unsettling aspect of this de-
cision, however, lies in the Court's unwillingness to recognize the mod-
em context in which first amendment rights are to be exercised. The
policy of keeping the public well informed, which underlies many free
speech decisions and which was heavily emphasized in both Marsh
and Logan Valley, can easily be thwarted if courts do not adapt first
amendment principles to modem realities. The specter of the sub-
urban cordon sanitaire of parking lots evoked in Logan Valley"5 may
well be realized. Shopping centers have become a suburban way of
life, continually growing in size, number, and comprehensiveness, in
many communities replacing the traditional town center.8 9 How is
34. The complex doctrine of state action lies at the base of all fourteenth amend-
ment cases, but a detailed discussion of that doctrine is beyond the scope of this article.
It is clear that some form of state action is necessary to state a cause of action under
the fourteenth amendment and 42 U.S.C. § 1983, quoted in note 1 supra. See Civil
Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3 (1883). In general, there are three principal tests of state
action: 1) Significant degree of state involvement. See, e.g., Burton v. Wilmington
Parking Auth., 365 U.S. 715 (1961); Anderson v. Moses, 185 F. Supp. 727 (S.D.N.Y.
1960). 2) State court's enforcement of a common law right. See, e.g., Shelley v.
Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1 (1948). 3) Public nature of the function performed. See, e.g.,
Evans v. Newton, 382 U.S. 296 (1966); Terry v. Adams, 345 U.S. 461 (1953); Smith
v. Alwright, 321 U.S. 649 (1944). The lines between these branches of the doctrine
are not always clear, nor is it always clear upon which branch a court is basing its
decision. Marsh v. Alabama and Logan Valley Plaza are generally cited as examples
of the "public function" branch. See, e.g., Evans v. Newton, supra, Cottonwood Mall
Shopping Center v. Utah Power & Light, 440 F.2d 36 (10th Cir. 1971), cert. denied,
404 U.S. 857 (1971); Amalgamated Clothing Workers v. Wonderland Shopping Center,
370 Mich. 157, 122 N.W.2d 785 (1963); T. EMERSON, Tim SYSTEM OF FREEDOM Or
EXPRESSION 308 (1970); 20 TuL. L. Rav. 593 (1946).
35. Lloyd Corp. v. Tanner, 407 U.S. 551, 570 (1972).
36. The question of state action is crucial since it determines whether or not
freedom of speech must be balanced against the rights of private property, and given
the preferred position of first amendment rights, the balance would almost invariably
be struck in favor of speech.
37. Id. at 562-63, 565 n.13.
38. See note 15 supra and accompanying text.
39. In October, 1972, the nation's 14,500 shopping centers accounted for 46 percent
of all retail sales (excluding gasoline and autos), and that figure is expected to rise
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol1973/iss2/5
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this public to remain well-informed? Will it inevitably hear only that
which building developers wish them to hear, effectively silencing those
with no access to the mass media?4 In the absence of more definite
Supreme Court guidelines, the future of the first amendment in sub-
urbia is uncertain.
steadily, since 80 percent of all new retail space will be in shopping centers. Brecken-
feld, "Downtown" Has Fled to the Suburbs, FORTUNE, October, 1972, at 87. Shop-
ping center owners consciously attempt to perform the function of a traditional town
center. See, e.g., CHAIN STORE AGE, January, 1972, at E 13 (exec. ed.); Shopping
Centers Have Grown into Shopping Cities, BusINEss WEEK, September 4, 1971, at 34.
There has been a clear trend in recent years for new shopping complexes to include
apartments, churches, office buildings, medical centers, etc. Id. at 36.
40. An unsuccessful congressional candidate in the 1972 election primarily at-
tributed his landslide defeat in the suburban sections of his district to the recent Lloyd
decision. Low budget political campaigns generally rely heavily on leaflet distribution
in crowded public areas. Once banished from the shopping centers, the district's only
central gathering places, he faced the onerous task of door-to-door canvassing of
100,000 widely dispersed houses, while his better-funded opponent conducted a mass
media campaign. Shapiro, Democracy in Action: One Who Lost, WASHINGTON
MONTHLY, December, 1972, at 11.
435
Washington University Open Scholarship
